The ability to measure or assess who has control over an area and its population-the insurgents or the government is an important element in an insurgency or counterinsurgency effort. Who has control is determined not merely by who has more guns and firepower but primarily by who has more sympathizers-informers, food suppliers, messengers, and taxpayers-and committed supporters-cadres, soldiers, tax collectors, and risk takers. Support of the people is vital to the survival of the insurgents who depend on them for food, shelter, recruits, and intelligence. The government’s challenge is to regain the allegiance of a population already alienated by government failures to address basic grievances. Poor peasants and farmers are, however, seldom motivated by abstractions or vague promises. Their willingness to provide supporthinges on concrete incentives-material benefits or demonstrable threats.
Three factors-attitudes, organization, andsecurity are criticalto establishing control. One is best able to analyze the contest for control by answering several questions related to each of these factors.
Attitudes
Neither the government nor the insurgents can control an area without the sympathetic support of part of the local population, including at least a small core of individuals willing to undertake risks.
Favorable attitudes among the local populace
Is the rural population highly receptive to government/insurgent propaganda?
Are acts of government repression/guerrilla terrorism perceived locally as indiscriminate or discriminatory?
Do government/guerrilla combat operationshave exclusively military goals? Or, do combat operations considerthe psychological and political impact on the local population?
Are there government/insurgent policies that the peasants feel are particularly unfair?
Ability tomotivate individuals to take risks
Are local government officials/guerrilla leaders drawn mainly fromthe local population, or are they outsiders?
Are civilian militias/guerrilla bands composed mainly of local residents, or are they, outsiders?
What percentageof householdsin a community have members in the local civilianmilitia?
Organization
The organizational capabilities exhibited by each side at the local level are vital to mobilizing and utilizing local resources, orchestrating propaganda activities, and ensuring the effectiveness of local security forces.
The ability of organizations to mobilize and organize people locally
Do the villagers participate in government- or insurgent-sponsored civilian activities? Is participation voluntary?
Are local government/insurgent leader’s dynamic personalitiescapable of injecting vigor into their organizations?
Ability of organizations to provide material benefits to supporters at the local level
Does membership in government/insurgent organizations provide an opportunity for upward mobility or economicreward?
Do government programs or guerrillarecruitment significantlyimprove employmentopportunities at the local level?
Are government services perceived locally as adequate? Or, are there generalized complaints condemning bureaucratic incompetence, red tape, or corruption?
Is the rural population supportive of government/insurgent programs de-signed for its benefit (such as land reform, rent control, cooperatives, and credit)?
The ability of organizations to exploit local resources
How successful are government officials/insurgents in collecting taxes and receiving services and recruits from the local population?
Do government officials/insurgent leaders implement nationalgovernment/insurgent directives inflexibly or do they adaptthemto local conditions?
Security
It is essential that each side be capable of protecting its local political apparatus, cadres, and supporters from enemy forces and assassins. Failure to perform this function is usually accompanied by a breakdown in morale and discipline, and occasionally by a complete collapse of one’s entire organization.
Ability to protect supporters and the local population
Do government/guerrilla forces adequately protect local supporters on a 24-hour basis
Do national army “reaction forces” respond quickly and effectively to reports of guerrilla attacks on local civilian militias or pro-government communities?
Do local government officials/insurgent cadres sleep in villages, or do they seek the protection of armed camps?
Are national army troops/guerrillas viewed locally as threatening outsiders or as helpful allies?
Is the local militia seen as a source of protection by the rural population or as merely another distrusted police force?
Local military effectiveness
Are local civilian militias aggressive in small-unit, day and night patrolling, or do they avoid contact with the enemy?
Do government/guerrilla forces have an effective intelligence network at the local level?
How disciplined are government/insurgent forces in combat? Do they usually recover the weapons and bodies of fallen comrades before retreating?
Are local government/insurgent forces capable of executing coordinated attacks against nearby enemy strong points.
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